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Comment
ICEBERG APPROPRIATION AND THE ANTARCTIC'S
GORDIAN KNOT
At the bottom of this planet we call earth there lies a vast con-
tinent known as Antarctica. It is a frozen land displaying a variety
of physical wonders unique unto itself. Due to its generally inhos-
pitable environment, Antarctica's indigenous population is limited
strictly to life forms especially adapted to existence in a sub-zero
climate. Antarctica is unique in many other respects. Most nota-
bly, the continent displays a serenity unlike any other place on
earth known to man. However, just as man's ingenuity has enabled
him to reach the moon, so has it resulted in Antarctica becoming
less isolated from the rest of the world. Indeed, the serenity that
has characterized Antarctica for countless millenia was jeopardized
by man's exploits in that continent during the late 19th and early
20th Centuries.
As man's ability to travel to, and survive in, adverse climates
improved, Antarctica soon became the subject of extensive scien-
tific explorations. Yet, that which originally began as a quest for
scientific knowledge was quickly transformed into international
discord. Competition between nations to acquire dominion over
the continent was the source of controversy. In the course of this
dispute there developed a fundamental split among the competing
states on the question of whether Antarctic territory could be the
object of national appropriation. There were those nations which
maintained, as they still do today, that the continent should be
treated no differently than any other sovereignless territory - thus,
subject to state appropriation. A contrariant view was that due to
Antarctica's severe climate, effective occupation was impossible
and hence territorial claims of sovereignty ineffective.
These fundamentally factious viewpoints generated considera-
ble consternation within the group of twelve nations engaged in re-
search on the continent. Aware of the potential dangers this schism
posed, the twelve interested states set out to quell the rising tide of
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controversy. Their efforts resulted in the Antarctic Treaty of 1959.'
By unanimous consensus it was agreed that the Treaty's fundamen-
tal objective was to ensure that Antarctica would never be the scene
of international conflict. These efforts to maintain a model of
peaceful international coexistence may presently be in jeopardy.
The Treaty's silence on resource exploitation, and the concomitant
interest by many nations in developing Antarctica's natural re-
sources, is the source of this danger.
Perhaps the most important resource offered by the Antarctic
is its vast frozen reservoirs of fresh water. These reservoirs are
found in the Antarctic's massive ice shelves which produce
thousands of fresh water icebergs annually. The idea of utilizing
icebergs as a fresh water source is not novel to our century.2 What
has recently emerged, however, is a heretofore unprecedented inter-
est in this concept by the international community.3 Recent scien-
tific studies indicate that large scale iceberg harvesting is not only
feasible4 but may well produce sizeable capital returns in view of
1. Done Dec. 1, 1959, 12 U.S.T. 794, T.I.A.S. No. 4780, 402 U.N.T.S. 71 [hereinafter
cited as Antarctic Treaty]. The twelve original signatories include Argentina, Australia,
Belgium, Chile, France, Japan, New Zealand, Norway, South Africa, Union of Soviet So-
cialist Republics, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Brazil, Czechoslovakia, Den-
mark, East Germany, the Netherlands, Poland, and Romania have subsequently ratified the
Treaty. See U.S. DEPT. OF STATE, TREATIES IN FORCE ON JANUARY 1, 1976, at 315 (1976).
2. A recent scientific study has established that "iceberg harvesting" may have been
conducted as early as 1853. It was during the winter of 1853-54 that a ship supplying San
Francisco with lake ice first took on a cargo of glacier ice from Baird Glacier in Alaska.
Thirty-seven years later, small icebergs were both towed and sailed along the west coast of
South America between Laguna San Rafael, Chile and Callao, Peru over distances exceed-
ing 3,800 kilometers. Weeks & Campbell, Icebergs as a Fresh Water Source.- An Appraisal,
12 J. GLACIOLOGY 207 (1973).
3. Some significant manifestations of this new interest have recently emerged from the
state of California and from Saudi Arabia. Prince Mohammed al Faisal of Saudi Arabia
recently sponsored the first International Conference on Iceberg Utilization at Iowa State
University. Scientists from 18 nations delivered papers on various aspects of iceberg utiliza-
tion. The Prince boasted that his newly formed Iceberg Transportation Company Interna-
tional Ltd. could deliver an iceberg on the scale of 100 million tons to any prospective
customer within 30 months of receipt of their invoice. Los Angeles Times, Oct. 3, 1977, pt. 1,
at 1, col. 4; Wall St. J., Oct. 5, 1977, at 1, col. 4; San Diego Union, Oct 6, 1977, at 14, col. I.
On February 22, 1978, a California State Assembly Committee unanimously approved a
resolution introduced by Senator Robert Beverly that would request federal agencies to sup-
port a pilot program to study the possibility of towing Antarctic icebergs to California. Los
Angeles Times, Feb. 22, 1978, pt. II, at 4, col. I. Other reports indicate that Antarctica may
also contain vast reserves of fossil fuels and other strategic resources. See generaly Ant-
arctica's Icy Assets, NEWSWEEK, Oct. 3, 1977, at 92.
4. That such an endeavor is in fact viable is evidenced by the introduction of the exten-
sive study conducted by Weeks and Campbell.
We initially undertook the present study because our intuition 'told' us the idea was
untenable and we thought that we could easily prove that this was the case, thereby
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present desalination costs and ever increasing market demands for
fresh water.' These surveys may be the first indicators of a major
international iceberg harvesting industry for future generations.
Because Antarctic ice shelves hold 90% of the earth's fresh water
and account for the greatest reserve of harvestable icebergs, that
continent is the most suitable site for such a venture.6
Although the technical feasibility of harvesting icebergs is
manifest, such a venture poses critical, yet unanswered, interna-
tional legal questions. The fundamental question is whether
Antarctic icebergs are subject to legal appropriation despite the
purported territorial and resource claims of several Antarctic
Treaty Group (ATG) states.7 It will be demonstrated that even if
claims of sovereignty in the Antarctic are deemed valid under inter-
national law, this conclusion will have no effect on the legal ap-
propriability of Antarctic icebergs. This will be achieved by
illustrating that the iceberg calving phenomenon resembles the
property concept of erosion, and that by applying this legal princi-
ple to the calving process, icebergs may be free appropriated.
This comment will conclude with a review of several legal regimes
advanced to promote the wise and equitable development of Ant-
arctica's natural resources.
laying the idea to rest. Our intuition proved to be wrong and we now believe that
the idea is, indeed, highly attractive ....
Weeks & Campbell, supra note 2, at 207.
5. Professor John Issacs of the Scripps Institute of Oceanography has determined that
in order to "arrive at southern California with something worthwhile at the end of [a] tow-
line, [one] would have to start with an [ice]berg on the order of two miles wide and ten miles
long." San Diego Union, Oct. 6, 1977, at 14, col. 1. "A ten mile long iceberg could be hauled
into the Peru (Humbolt) Current, which flows from the south along South America, and
ultimately to Los Angeles where it could supply freshwater to that city for three weeks at less
than the 1970 rates." ENCYCLOPAEDIA BRITANNICA, 9 MACROPAEDIA 154 (1974) [hereinaf-
ter cited as 9 MACROPAEDIA]; see also Weeks & Campbell, supra note 2. See generally J.
Hult & N. Ostrander, Antarctic Icebergs as a Global Fresh Water Resource, R-1255-NSF
(RAND Corporation grant under the National Science Foundation's Research Applied to
National Needs Program, Oct. 1973). The present cost for desalination of salt water is ap-
proximately 80 cents per cubic meter. It has been calculated that short term costs of iceberg
freshwater could be approximately 50 cents per cubic meter. However, it is believed that as
iceberg transport technology develops, the cost should drop below 25 cents per cubic meter.
This figure would be closer to the 10 cent per cubic meter rates presently paid by residents of
the city of San Diego. San Diego Union, Oct. 6, 1977, at 14, col. 1.
6. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY CIRCULAR 705, MINERAL RESOURCES OF ANTARCTICA 15
(N. Wright & P. Williams eds. 1974). See also Weeks & Campbell, supra note 2, at 661.
7. The claimant states include Argentina, Australia, Chile, France, New Zealand, Nor-
way, and Great Britain.
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I. RESOURCE EXPLOITATION UNDER THE ANTARCTIC
TREATY OF 1959
Since 1961, all activities conducted in Antarctica became sub-
ject to the terms of the Antarctic Treaty of 1959. The Treaty's pri-
mary objective, as recited in its preamble, is to ensure that
"Antarctica shall continue forever to be used exclusively for peace-
ful purposes and shall not become the scene or object of interna-
tional discord."'  The Treaty contains no express provisions
governing resource exploitation.9 Deliberate circumvention' ° of
the exploitation issue has prompted the United States to attribute a
broad meaning to the Treaty's article I "peaceful purposes"
clause." This liberal American interpretation holds that since the
language of article I specifically proscribes only activities of a mili-
tary nature,' 2 all other non-military activities, including resource
exploitation, are permissible.' 3 Although such an interpretation is
not wholly inconsistent with the language of article 1, 4 its language
8. The preamble's language was probably inspired by some minor confrontations
which had flared up between Argentina and Great Britain regarding their overlapping terri-
torial claims in Antarctica. For instance, on February 15, 1953, the British deployed a de-
tachment of Royal Marines to dismantle an Argentinian hut located at Port Foster,
Deception Island. The area had long been claimed by both countries under the so-called
'sector principle." 2 M. WHITEMAN, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 1238 (1963). For an
explanation of the sector principle, see note 81 infra.
9. Hanessian, Overview- Some International Legal Considerations, in SCIENCE, TECH-
NOLOGY, AND SOVEREIGNTY IN THE POLAR REGIONS 69 (G. Schatz ed. 1974). See also Hear-
ings on U.S. Policy with Respect to Mineral Resource Exploration and Exploitation in the
Antarctic Before the Subcomm. on Oceans and International Environment of the Senate Comm.
on Foreign Relations, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975) [hereinafter cited as U. S Antarctic Policy].
10. Hanessian has written that the motive underlying the deliberate avoidance of the
economic exploitation issue stemmed from the treaty drafters' belief that resolution of the
question, at the time, would be impossible. Hanessian, supra note 9, at 69.
11. U.S. Antarctic Policy, supra note 9, at 9; see also Lundquist, The Iceberg Cometh?"
International Law Relating to Antarctic Iceberg Exploitation, 17 NAT. RES. J. 1 (1977);
accord, Rose, Antarctic Condominium: Building a New Legal Orderfor Commerical Interests,
11 MARINE TECH. & SCI. J. 19, 24 (1976).
12. Article I(1) provides that "Antarctica shall be used for peaceful purposes only.
There shall be prohibited, inter alia, any measures of a military nature, such as the establish-
ment of bases and fortifications, the carrying out of military maneuvers, as well as the testing
of any type of weapons." Antarctic Treaty, supra note 1, art. I(1).
13. U.S. Antarctic Policy, supra note 9, at 19; E. McDOWELL, DIGEST OF UNITED
STATES PRACTICE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 1975, at 105 (1976). See also Rose, supra note
11, at 24.
14. One writer has stated that the United States' "interpretation of the treaty is defi-
nitely a minority view among the contracting parties, and it is likely that the claimant signa-
tories hold that the treaty's silence on the issue of commercial interests was in deference to
the pre-treaty claims." Rose, supra note 11, at 24.
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is plagued with sufficient ambiguities to warrant further inquiry
into the drafters' intent at the time of the Treaty's composition.
The final text of the Treaty indicates that little attention was
directed toward the subject of resource exploitation. 5 One author-
ity has labelled this an intentional omission stemming from the sig-
natories' general ignorance of potential resource deposits in
existence in Antarctica at that time. 16 Moreover, the political diffi-
culties which confronted the drafters in the production of the
Treaty's final text most likely detracted from the obvious signifi-
cance of the exploitation issue.' 7 The drafters' failure to consider
this issue arguably precludes the American proposition that re-
source exploitation qualifies as a legitimate "peaceful purpose"
within the meaning of article I. 18 Furthermore, no indication exists
to suggest that the drafters envisioned the distinct possibility of ice-
berg harvesting.' 9
Despite the arguments against the American interpretation of
article I, this position still possesses strength, if not on the potent
influence of American authority alone. The distinct possibility of
Antarctica soon becoming the object of major international ex-
ploitation would seem to increase inversely with the depletion of
presently known oil and mineral reserves. Given the possibility
that iceberg harvesting may qualify under the "peaceful purposes"
clause of article I, the controversial sovereignty issue must be clari-
fied before Antarctic resource exploitation is undertaken. Thus,
further examination of the United States' position vis-ti-vis sover-
eignty rights in Antarctica is required.2"
15. See Hanessian, supra note 9, at 69.
16. Hambro, Some Notes on the Future of the Antarctic Treaty Collaboration, 68 AM. J.
INT'L L. 217 (1974).
17. Hambro believes that practical considerations warranted against the inclusion of a
resource exploitation provision.
Since [the economic exploitation question] could not have been ignored, they must
have been at least implicitly excluded .... It was probably difficult enough to
reach an agreement on the treaty as it stands. Why then complicate matters with
economic considerations which probably were not of any practical importance in
the minds of the delegates at that time?
Id at 221. The difficulties alluded to by Hambro stemmed from the strong divisions within
the ATG states regarding the validity of national claims in the Antarctic. See G. HACK-
WORTH, I DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 453-65 (1940); WHITEMAN, supra note 8, at 1238.
18. Rose, supra note i, at 24. At least one author has remarked that the Treaty's si-
lence on the issue of commercial interests was in deference to the pre-treaty claims and not
because these questions had been resolved under article I. Id
19. Hanessian, supra note 9, at 69.
20. Without such an examination, one could only conclude that resource exploitation
could be conducted solely in Antarctic areas presently occupied by the United States or other
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A. The "Sovereignty Claims" Controversy
Ratification of the Antarctic Treaty signaled the end of several
decades of political dispute over the appropriability of Antarctica."
At issue was the precise legal status to be accorded the Antarctic
continent. In turn, this status was determinative of whether Antarc-
tica would be subject to claims of national appropriation. Two ba-
sic positions prevailed among the signatories. The first, asserted by
seven claimant countries,2" viewed Antarctica as any other land ter-
ritory - susceptible to territorial claims and the exercise of na-
tional sovereignty.23 The opposite view, espoused by the United
States and the Soviet Union, considered all territorial claims to the
Antarctic as void for failure of the ATG states to satisfy the inter-
national legal standard for territorial appropriations.24 The United
States-Soviet Union position treated Antarctica as terra nullius25
and as such incapable of being the object of a nation's territorial
claim.26 Although this schism prevented the drafters from conclu-
sively resolving this issue, the final text of article IV reflects an in-
genious compromise. Claimant states, although not renouncing
their claims of sovereignty, agreed not to assert or expand their
claims during the Treaty's thirty year duration.27 As a result, these
ATG states sharing its position. Such an answer, however, would leave unanswered the
question of whether a non-ATG nation could harvest icebergs off coastal areas under the
ostensible control of claimant ATG states. Ultimately, without the remaining ATG states'
acquiescence in the United States position, the United States could be confronted with seri-
ous challenges from the claimant ATG states if it attempted commercial exploitation beyond
its own sector of control.
21. See generally WHITEMAN, supra note 8, at 1238; see also note 17 supra.
22. See note 7 supra.
23. Hanessian, supra note 9, at 67.
24. The cases make it plain that today the decisive test of the effectiveness of an
occupation is whether the claimant has in fact displayed state functions in regard to
the territory sufficiently to assure to other states "the minimum protection of which
international law is the guardian." Accordingly, it is effective activity by the state,
either internally within the territory or externally in relations with other states
which is the foundation of a title by occupation, not settlement and exploitation.
Waldock, Disputed Sovereignty in the Falkland Island Dependencies, XXV BRIT. Y.B. INT'L
L. 311, 317 (1948). The United States and the Soviet Union simply maintain that the claim-
ant ATG states have failed to satisfy the above standard. They claim that this follows from
the Antarctic's inhospitable character. Hanessian, supra note 9, at 68. See generally I.
BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 141 (1973).
25. Terra nullius is defined as land belonging to no one; territory not annexed by any
nation. WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 2360 (unabr. ed. 1971).
26. Hanessian, supra note 9, at 67. See also Rose, supra note 11, at 24.
27. Article IV represents a model of political compromise. It states:
I. Nothing contained in the present Treaty shall be interpreted as:
a. a renunciation by any Contracting Party of previously asserted rights of or
claims to territorial sovereignty in Antarctica;
Vol. 9
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claims have been placed in a state of "legal limbo" for the life span
of the Treaty.28
Under the United States-Soviet Union view - Antarctica be-
longs to no country - it follows that no sovereign exists to exert
jurisdiction over water column resources such as icebergs.29 Conse-
quently, appropriation of Antarctic icebergs within the region's
coastal waters presents few, if any, legal problems. Antithetically,
in the opinion of other claimant states, several sovereigns exist to
exert jurisdiction over all water column resources located within
their coastal waters.30 It is this latter position, known as the "na-
tional approach,"'" which poses the greatest obstacle to a legally
unencumbered scheme of iceberg harvesting. Although the legal
basis of the national approach is at best, tenuous,32 an analysis of
the impact of ownership claims to Antarctic ice shelves on iceberg
harvesting must be considered.
The legal ramifications of iceberg harvesting under the na-
tional approach vary according to the extent of the Antarctic's
glaciesfrmas33 which would be considered territory under such a
regime. Due to the unique geophysical characteristics of the
Antarctic continent, an attempt to delineate its territorial bounda-
ries demands consideration of the immense ice shelves that cover
the vast majority of actual land territory.34
b. a renunciation or diminution by any Contracting Party of any basis of
claim to territorial sovereignty in Antarctica which it may have whether as
a result of its activities or those of its nationals in Antarctica, or otherwise;
c. prejudicing the position of any Contracting Party as regards its recognition
or non-recognition of any other State's right of or basis of claim to territo-
rial sovereignty in Antarctica.
2. No acts or activities taking place while the present Treaty is in force shall con-
stitute a basis for asserting, supporting or denying a claim to territorial sovereignty
in Antarctica or create any rights of sovereignty in Antarctica. No new claim, or
enlargement of an existing claim, to territorial sovereignty in Antarctica shall be
asserted while the present Treaty is in force.
Antarctic Treaty, supra note 1, art. IV.
28. This is not to preclude a party's unilateral withdrawal whereby its obligations under
the Treaty would be terminated.
29. See Marcoux, Natural Resource Jurisdiction on the Antarctic Continental Margin, I I
VA. J. INT'L L. 374, 390 (1971). See also Lundquist, supra note 11, at 14 n.81.
30. Cf. Lundquist, supra note 1I, at 17 (where express acknowledgment is made as to
the possibility that sector claims could be found credible).
31. Id at 15.
32. See note 81 infra.
33. See Bernhardt, Sovereignty in Antarctica, 5 CALIF. W. INT'L L.J. 297, 308 (1975).
34. Id at 298. The Antarctic presents a truly stark and amazing vision to a touring
visitor. Geographically, Antarctica has been divided into two major areas: Eastern (Greater)
and Western (Lesser) Antarctica. Its topography consists of a great plateau in the Eastern
portion, averaging between 11,800 and 13,000 feet in elevation. The annual monthly mean
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Article VI of the Antarctic Treaty makes specific reference to
ice shelves. It states that "[t]he provisions of the present Treaty
shall apply to the area south of 600 South Latitude, including all ice
shelves."35 In order to properly evaluate the significance of this
language, inquiry must be made into the ice-forms specifically em-
braced by the Treaty as well as those purportedly excluded.
Generally, Antarctic ice can be grouped into three distinct cat-
egories. The first, referred to as "pack ice," is formed from freezing
seawater.36 The second, "sheet ice," originates on the Antarctic
continent and basically is composed of fresh water that has accu-
mulated over several millenia. 37 The third is designated as "shelf
ice" which is usually found "in bays or other sheltered areas.
' 38
Although shelf ice and pack ice share a common seawater origin,
the former differs from the latter in that such ice forms a shelf that
ultimately attaches itself to the land-based sheet ice; conversely, the
latter remains free-floating. 39 This distinction acquires additional
significance when viewed in the context of the ice forms included
within the language of article VI.
Due to its terrestial and relatively stationary nature, sheet ice
has been regarded by one authority as clearly within the ambit of
article VI.4 At the other extreme is pack ice. Because it is free-
floating, pack ice lacks a definitive reference point in relation to the
continent.4 ' The drafters of the Antarctic Treaty, undoubtedly
temperature of the plateau is approximately -68* F., although temperatures as low as -125 °
F. are not uncommon. During the warmest month, the mercury will rise as high as -30* F.
Western Antarctica is separated from the East by the Transantarctic Mountains. Western
Antarctica consists of an archipelago of mountainous islands covered and bonded together
by ice that is approximately 6,500 feet thick. Temperatures in the coastal regions will aver-
age 320 F. annually. Of course, one must also consider the wind chill factor created by
cyclonic winds frequently exceeding 150 miles per hour. In sum, Antarctica poses one of the
harshest environments on earth known to man. See ENCYCLOPAEDIA BRITANNICA, I
MACROPAEDIA 947 (1974).
35. Antarctic Treaty, supra note I, art. VI (emphasis added).




40. Bernhardt argues that the inclusion of sheet ice within the Antarctic area could not
be doubted. Id
41. Cf. Bernhardt, supra note 33, at 306 (wherein it is observed that the Arctic polar cap
is, and has always been, pack ice, without reference to any fixed continental point). The
reasoning advanced against the appropriability of the Polar cap is that occupation of such a
free floating glacial structure "would be too precarious and shifting to and fro to give anyone
a good title." HACKWORTH, supra note 17, at 450. Hackworth concludes that the interna-
tional legal principle of "freedom of the high seas" would logically apply to a moving sub-
Vol. 9
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aware of this distinctive ice form, most likely did not envision the
inclusion of pack ice within the term "ice shelf" as used in article
VI.42 Thus, under a national approach, political boundaries would
extend to all continental ice shelves regardless of their "sheet ice"
or "shelf ice" composition.43 On the other hand, all pack ice would
be excluded from "national" Antarctic territory and could not be
treated as comprising a portion of the Antarctic area within the
meaning of article VI.4
In the past, substantial conflict has surrounded the question of
whether Antarctic ice shelves should be elevated to the status of
territory.45 One line of argument holds that since ice shelves are no
more than the high seas in a frozen state, they are incapable of
national appropriation.' This argument appears particularly plau-
sible when referring to shelf ice since it is formed by the freezing of
seawater. However, the contemporary rationale for the freedom of
the high seas doctrine is that high seas freedom is essential to pro-
mote commercial interaction between states.47 In view of this ra-
tionale, the doctrine's inappropriateness in determining the legal
status of Antarctic ice shelves is manifest. The immense thickness
of the ice shelves precludes all forms of marine navigation beyond
their seaward perimeters.4 8  By contrast, the relatively stationary
nature of ice shelves renders them more akin to land than any other
geophysical feature on earth.49 Moreover, the textually demonstra-
ble intent of the Antarctic Treaty indicates that the continent's ice
stance such as the North Polar Sea ice. Id A similar conclusion can be reached in the
context of Antarctic pack ice.
42. Bernhardt, supra note 33, at 309; accord, Hayton, The Antarctic Settlement of 1959,
54 Am. J. INT'L L. 348 (1960). There can be little doubt that the Treaty's drafters were
cognizant of the distinctive ice forms existing in the Antarctic. This is evidenced by the
numerous legal works appearing more than two decades prior to the Treaty's drafting. See,
e.g., G. SMEDAL, ACQUISITION OF SOVEREIGNTY OVER POLAR REGIONS (1931); HACK-
WORTH, supra note 17, at 453.
43. Lundquist, supra note 11, at 28.
44. Bernhardt argues that since the Treaty provided for sheet ice, to the exclusion of any
other, it is assumed that pack ice was not to be included within the land definition. Bern-
hardt, supra note 33, at 309.
45. Id at 302.
46. HACKWORTH, supra note 17, at 452.
47. See Bernhardt, supra note 33, at 301; see also WHITEMAN, supra note 8, at 1266.
Another rationale advanced to support the freedom of the high seas doctrine is that the seas
are unappropriable due to their state of constant motion. See generally H. GROTIUS, MARE
LIBERUM (R. Magoffin trans. 1919). This is obviously inapplicable to the Antarctic's ice
shelves.
48. Bernhardt, supra note 33, at 309.
49. Id at 310; WHITEMAN, supra note 8, at 1266.
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shelves should be treated as comprising an actual part of the
"Antarctic region."5 Consequently, the Treaty provides sound au-
thority for the view that Antarctic ice shelves should be attributed
the same legal status as land territories. 5' This view has met with
noteworthy support: "[flor the purposes of the Treaty, Antarctica is
defined as 'the area south of 60' south latitude, including all ice
shelves . . . . ' By implication pack ice, fast ice and floating ice
"islands" separated from mainland attachment are not assimilated
to the status of territory .. ."I' Thus, alleged claims of national
sovereignty to the Antarctic continent must be acknowledged as in-
cluding the land-adjacent ice shelves as well. 3 This raises the
question of the legal effect of national ownership of the ice shelves
on the property rights to icebergs themselves. Resolution of this
question requires a preliminary examination of the geophysical re-
lationship between Antarctic ice shelves and icebergs.
Icebergs are produced, or "calved," from the seaward perime-
ters of Antarctic ice shelves.54 Iceberg "calving" is directly related
to the seaward movement of sheet ice 55 which, in turn, is caused by
surface accumulation and input of land ice. 6 The actual calving
process occurs at the point where the ice shelf meets the sea,57
whereupon a combination of physical forces causes intermittent
fluctuations in pressure, culminating in the severence of a portion
50. If the Antarctic Treaty language itself is examined it is apparent that Article VI
treats all ice shelves, as distinguished from pack ice, as glaciesfirma . . . . It cer-
tainly assimilates ice shelves to the 'area' of Antarctica and therefore presumably to
a land status.
Bernhardt, supra note 33, at 308.
51. Id; accord, Hayton, supra note 42, at 360 n.36 where the author states that "it
would seem proper to modify the concept of territory to accommodate such 'glaciesfirma'."
BROWNLIE, supra note 24, at 259; WHITEMAN, supra note 8, at 30; cf. Lakhtine, Right Over
the Arctic, 24 AM. J. INT'L L. 703, 712 (1930) (author argues that "floating ice should be
assimilated legally to open polar seas, whilst ice formations that are more or less immovable
should enjoy a legal status equivalent to polar territory").
52. Hayton, supra note 42, at 359 (emphasis added).
53. [Tlhe opinion may be hazarded that, even if the Court were to reject the possi-
bility of occupying the landless frozen seas of the Arctic, it might well recognize
sovereignty over Antarctic lands as including the shelf-ice.
WHITEMAN, supra note 8, at 1266.
54. It is estimated that Antarctic icebergs are produced, or "calved," at a rate of approx-
imately 1,800 cubic kilometers per year. 9 MACROPAEDIA, supra note 5, at 154.
55. Such movement has been described as "ice shelf creep." Id
56. ENCYCLOPAEDIA BRITANNICA, 15 MACROPAEDIA 1159 (1974) [hereinafter cited as
15 MACROPAEDIA]. The speed of the ice shell's movement or "creep" may vary from zero at
the continent's center to as much as 10 kilometers per year at the shelf's coastal edge. 9
MACROPAEDIA, supra note 5, at 154.
57. 9 MACROPAEDIA, supra note 5, at 154.
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of the shelf.58 This severed monolith of free-floating ice is com-
monly referred to as an iceberg. Although this explanation repre-
sents a simplification of the actual physical processes that occur, the
most significant aspect of the calving process relative to iceberg
property rights is the gradual and continuous character of the forces
involved.59
II. PROPERTY RIGHTS TO ICEBERGS UNDER A NATIONAL
APPROACH
It has been suggested that icebergs, because of their physical
characteristics at the harvesting stage, may be freely appropriated.6 °
This conclusion is based upon an analogy drawn between icebergs
and fish, the latter deemed inherently res nullius:61  "[d]ue to their
discreet nature, icebergs like fish are subject to seizure and reduc-
tion to private possession. Since the origin of the high seas doctrine
with Grotius, it has been recognized that these water column re-
sources can become privately owned. ' '62 However, several impor-
tant legal distinctions exist which militate against this analogy.
First, wild animals are, and derive from, chattel, as distinguished
from real property. Conversely, icebergs find their origins in
58. 15 MACROPAEDIA, supra note 56, at 1159.
[Piressure beneath the ice shelf ... interacts with the outward creeping glacier.
The tides ... along with wind and swells, result in intermittent increases and de-
creases in force on the protruding end of the ice shelf resulting in the birth of a
large monolith of drifting ice.
9 MACROPAEDIA, supra note 5, at 154.
59. It is this gradual advancement and retreat of the Antarctic ice shelves that has
prompted an analogy between the calving process and land erosion. See note 63 infra, and
accompanying text.
60. Lundquist, supra note 11, in an excellent article on the problem, examines the ap-
propriability of icebergs under several hypothetical regimes, including a national approach.
Under the aegis of this latter approach, all territorial claims in Antarctica would be recog-
nized as valid. His ultimate conclusion, in which this author concurs, holds that icebergs
may be freely harvested by any state. However, the author's analysis of the property status
of icebergs is open to question. Lundquist's conclusion is reached on the basis of a direct
analogy between icebergs and fish. However, one should first inquire into the possible prop-
erty rights which may be vested in icebergs vis-,i-vi the claimant states from whose territo-
ries they derive. It is logical to presume that resources which at one time may have
comprised a part of a state's national territory remain its property in the absence of some
intervening legal transmutation prior to acquisition of that resource by a third party. Omis-
sion of this line of inquiry would leave open the question of whether icebergs remain the
property of the claimant state, or become res nullius. Anything less could result in a legal
anamoly whereby a state would be permitted to convert unlawfully the natural resources of
another state, possibly within the latter's territorial sea. See Lundquist, supra note 11, at 17.
61. Id at 23; see note 25 supra, and accompanying text.
62. Lundquist, supra note 11, at 17.
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Antarctic ice shelves which, insofar as Antarctica is concerned, are
deemed real property. Second, since wild animals are considered to
be inherently res nullius, they are capable of undergoing only one
legal transformation. This change entails their reduction from res
nullius to res privatae by virtue of someone's effective possession
thereof. For icebergs to attain a comparable legal status, they must
undergo two distinct legal transformations. The first occurs upon
the calving of the iceberg from its maternal ice shelf. This consti-
tutes a transformation from res immobiles, in which title would be
vested in some state, to res nullius. This physical transformation
entails a change from real property to chattel. Subsequently, a sec-
ond legal transformation occurs upon the iceberg's seizure by its
first finder. This final transformation reduces the iceberg's status
even further, that is, from res nullius to res privatae. Thus, there
exists sufficient reason to examine other possible alternative modes
of analysis. The direct analogy between icebergs and fish is too
tenuous to warrant unquestioned acceptance. A better analogy
more readily presents itself in the legal doctrines of erosion and
avulsion.
A. Application of the Doctrines of Erosion and A vulsion to Ice
She/f Calving
Iceberg calving has been considered closely analogous to the
land processes of erosion and avulsion because "calving" results
from the continuous receding and advancing of ice shelves. 63 With-
out the aid of scientific instruments, observation of "ice shelf
creep," like land erosion, is practically impossible.64 Hence, the ba-
sic similarity of imperceptible physical forces in both calving and
erosion permits a legal analogy to be drawn between the two resul-
tant property forms. On the basis of this parallel reasoning, the
legal principles governing the status of territory affected by erosion
and avulsion are appropriate to delineate the property status of ice-
bergs.
Erosion has been defined as the gradual eating away of the
land by currents, winds, or tides.65 Viewing the calving process in
this definitional context, the "eating away" element of erosion is
63. "While it is true that under general terrestial principles the loss of such legal por-
tions of a land domain is unusual, the process should be analogized to . . . erosion and
avulsion, as these processes are not inherently dissimilar in nature." Bernhardt, supra note
33, at 305.
64. 15 MACROPAEDIA, supra note 56, at 1159.
65. WHITEMAN, supra note 8, at 1084.
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found in the resultant loss of territory from Antarctic ice shelves
which results from the calving phenomenon.66 Yet, an initial diffi-
culty with the land analogy is encountered with respect to the
"gradual" qualification in the definition of erosion. Whether the
word "gradual" refers to the actual loss of territory, or the rate at
which the natural physical forces act to cause that loss, is uncertain.
However, the legal ramifications flowing from this finespun distinc-
tion are crucial to the resolution of the issue. If the word "gradual"
means the time span during which the loss of territory through ero-
sion becomes an observable phenomenon, then the erosion princi-
ple is inapplicable in determining the status of icebergs. This
follows since icebergs sever from the maternal ice shelf in a sudden
and swift occurrence resulting from the cumulative effect of im-
perceptible physical forces continuously at work. This interpreta-
tion undermines the applicability of the erosion principle. Yet, the
very facts which undermine the erosion doctrine give rise to the
application of the avulsion doctrine. Avulsion specifically relates to
sudden and significant territorial changes such as those occurring
during the calving process.67 If, however, "gradual" means the ve-
locity of the natural physical processes causing the territorial losses,
the utility of the erosion principle remains. The "gradualness" ele-
ment of the definition of erosion can then be analogized to the
ongoing and imperceptible "creep" of the ice shelves.68 Moreover,
the role of the tides and winds, and their effect on the calving pro-
cess, clearly fall within the purview of the above definition.69 Be-
cause the meaning of "gradual" is unclear, and hence the
application of the erosion doctrine uncertain, the effect of both the
doctrine of erosion and avulsion on the territorial claims in Antarc-
tica must be considered.
According to the property concept of avulsion, a sudden and
significant change in a state's geographical boundary will not dis-
rupt that state's sovereign jurisdiction over an affected area.7°
Thus, in the Antarctic context, a claimant state's political bounda-
ries would be unaffected by any geographical change due to iceberg
calving. The state would continue to retain jurisdiction over pre-
cisely the same geographical area even though a portion of that
area had become exposed open sea. This result would apply with
66. Bernhardt, supra note 33, at 306.
67. See note 59 supra.
68. See text accompanying note 65 supra.
69. See id
70. See WHITEMAN, supra note 8, at 1084.
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equal force to the delimitation of that state's territorial sea.7 Con-
sidering these conspicuous boundary transformations caused by
iceberg calving, application of the avulsion principle results in an
unprecedented means of extending sovereignty over the high seas.72
There are other compelling reasons which militate against the
application of the avulsion doctrine. Avulsion has been applied
generally to sudden boundary changes occurring solely in a river
separating two neighboring states." This differs significantly from
the calving phenomenon that occurs at the "ice shelf-open seas"
interface. Furthermore, application of the avulsion doctrine would
directly contravene the 1958 Convention on the Territorial Sea and
Contiguous Zone74 which specifically requires that a state's terri-
torial sea be measured from the low water mark on the shore line.7 5
By analogizing the calving process to avulsion for the purpose of
determining the extent of national claims, a claimant state's politi-
cal boundary would remain unchanged regardless of the sudden
inclusion of open sea that results. This clearly precludes a determi-
nation of a state's territorial sea on the basis of the 1958 Conven-
tion and consequently leads to more legal ambiguities than
presently exist.
The unique physical traits of Antarctic ice shelves avail them-
selves more readily to the doctrine of erosion. Application of the
71. Cf id at 1266 ("the chief significance of the ice-packs being held to be legally capa-
ble of occupation would be to extend the territorial waters ....").
72. To illustrate, if state As present ice shelf boundary lies at a point 2000 miles from
the geometric south pole, its territorial sea would extend to a point 12 miles offshore, or 2012
miles from the south pole. If a large iceberg calves, resulting in a territorial loss of 2 miles,
state X, under the avulsion doctrine, would be entitled to exercise its sovereignty over 14
miles of sea. Such a result would necessarily follow because state Xs territorial boundary
would remain at its original point, 2000 miles from the south pole. The danger of applying
such a concept to the Antarctic becomes more acute in light of the extraordinary changes an
ice shelf may undergo. For instance, in 1956, the U.S.S. Glacier sighted an iceberg of incred-
ible dimensions. It had a length of 333 kilometers (208 miles) and a width of 100 kilometers
(60 miles). Theoretically, if such an iceberg were again calved, a state claiming sovereignty
over the calving shelf could exert its jurisdiction as far as 220 miles out to sea. This would
clearly be contrary to the law of the sea as it now stands. See id at 1266; see also New Jersey
v. Delaware, 291 U.S. 361 (1934).
73. "[Alvulsion has reference to a sudden change in the channel of a stream .
WHITEMAN, supra note 8, at 1084; see also New Jersey v. Delaware, 291 U.S. 361 (1934).
74. Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, done Apr. 29, 1958, 15
U.S.T. 1606, T.I.A.S. No. 5639, 516 U.N.T.S. 205 (1964) [hereinafter cited as Territorial Sea
Convention].
75. Id art. 3.
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erosion principle would prevent unprecedented extensions of a
state's jurisdiction over the seas. A state's boundary line would co-
incide with the ice shelf's contour as it advanced or receded. The
flexibility of this approach would create its own problems in that
the limits of a territorial sea might change considerably within a
given year. However, this problem could be overcome by designat-
ing an arbitrary "base-line" calculated on average expansions of
the ice shelves observed over a period of several years.76 Indeed,
such an approach would find support in modern international law
developed specifically to deal with problems presented by highly
irregular coastlines.17 In light of the suitability of the erosion doc-
trine to the unique geophysical nature of Antarctica, the next in-
quiry concerns the effect of that doctrine on the property status of
icebergs.
It is well established that whatever territory may be gained by
accretion or lost by erosion is recognized as legally valid.78 Apply-
ing this rule to the case of Antarctic icebergs, any property rights
which may have been vested in a claimant sovereign by virtue of its
ownership of the calving ice shelf are extinguished upon the ice-
berg's severance. It then follows that in the absence of any such
property rights, icebergs must be treated as res nufiius.79  Conse-
quently, they are capable of becoming objects of personalty upon
possession by their first finder. Ultimately, icebergs, like wild ani-
76. Thus, in the event of an ice shelf's advancement, accretion provides a lawful means
by which a state may acquire new territory accumulated by operation of nature. See BisHop,
INTERNATIONAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 363 (2d ed. 1962). The legal consequences
flowing from such an event would include the vesting of title in the contiguous state, as well
as an outward extension of its maritime frontiers. See VON GLAHN, LAW AMONG NATIONS:
AN INTRODUCTION TO PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 276 (3rd ed. 1976). This principle is
based upon the ancient Roman territorial doctrine that a "thing which is added follows the
fate of the principal thing." Id Similarly, should the converse occur, the correlative princi-
ple of erosion would provide for inland readjustments in a state's territory as well. See
Kansas v. Missouri, 322 U.S. 213 (1944).
77. Thus, if glaciological observations reveal that an ice shelf's seaward creep extends
to an average point of 2000 miles from the south pole, a demarcation line could be drawn at
this location. In the event of an exceptional advancement or retreat of the ice shelf, the
territorial boundary, and in turn the territorial sea, would be determined under the doctrines
of accretion and erosion respectively. See note 75 supra. Cf. The Fisheries Case, [1959]
I.C.J. 116 (wherein it was held that historic "economic" considerations justified the use of
parallel base lines to the Norwegian coast). It is arguable that historically unique "geophysi-
cal" considerations could well justify usage of a similar parallel base line system in the
Antarctic.
78. WHITEMAN, supra note 8, at 1084; accord, VON GLAHN, supra note 76, at 303.
79. "A thing which has no owner .... " BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1470 (4th ed.
1968).
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mals, may be the objects of private ownership upon their seizure
and effective possession by any state.8" The process, however, by
which each attains its res nullius status remains as distinctively dif-
ferent as the respective source from which each derived.
1II. A REVIEW OF LEGAL REGIMES FOR RESOURCE
EXPLOITATION IN THE ANTARCTIC MARGINAL AREAS
The preceding discussion has presumed that a national ap-
proach regime would be imposed over the Antarctic area. Such a
regime would be based upon the so-called "sector theory"'" for
which little logical support may be found under the modem law of
nations.82 Therefore, the discussion that follows will assume that
no sovereign claims to the Antarctic are viewed as valid.
In the absence of a coastal sovereign, the coastal waters of Ant-
arctica cannot constitute a territorial sea; rather they must be
treated as high seas.83 A similar conclusion is applicable in the
80. See H. GROTIUS, MARE LIBERUM (R. Magoffin trans. 1919), quoted in H.G.
KNIGHT, THE LAW OF THE SEA: CASES, DOCUMENTS, AND READINGS 20 (1975). This does
not, however, signify that a coastal sovereign may not require the issuance of licenses for any
iceberg harvesting conducted within its territorial waters. The authority to do so, however,
would stem from the coastal state's jurisdiction over its territorial sea and not because of a
property claim to the icebergs themselves. See text accompanying notes 62-63 supra.
81. The sector theory finds its legal basis in the archaic and generally disapproved doc-
trine of contiguity. Its first implementation arose in the Arctic, whereby states such as Ca-
nada and the Soviet Union sought to justify their territorial claims to that polar cap.
However, the seven claimant ATG states have found it a convenient and suitable means to
acquire sovereignty over the Antarctic as well. Simply stated, "[a] state whose territory lies
close to the [Antarctic] claims all land to be found between a line extending from its eastern
extremity to the [South] Pole and another line extending from its western extremity to the
Pole." VAN GLAHN, supra note 76, at 284. For an excellent treatment of the sector principle,
see Bernhardt, supra note 33, at 332; see also BROWNLIE, supra note 24, at 154.
82. BROWNLIE, supra note 24, at 154. The sector theory, upon which the Antarctic
claims are based, has been severly criticized and dismissed as constituting a means of acquir-
ing title to terra nullius. See Marcoux, supra note 29, at 374; accord, KISH, THE LAW OF
INTERNATIONAL SPACES 32 (1973); Jessup, Sovereignty in Antarctica, 41 AM. J. INT'L L. 119
(1947). It is doubtful "whether the claims of states under sector declarations are either suffi-
ciently clear in their application to ice or sufficiently well founded in law . WHITE-
MAN, supra note 8, at 1266. "[D]ue to the misapplication of a dubious international law
theory, the greater weight of authority discredits the national sector claims in Antarctica."
Id "[Tihe international acceptability of a segmented national approach to Antarctic sover-
eignty is at minimum highly questionable." Lundquist, supra note 11, at 17.
83. This conclusion is inevitable since article I of the Convention on the Territorial Sea
presupposes the existence of a coastal sovereign. The logical negative implication is that
there can be no territorial sea where no sovereign exists. "The sovereignty of a State extends
...to a belt of sea adjacent to its coast, described as the territorial sea." Territorial Sea
Convention, supra note 74, art. 1; see also Marcoux, supra note 29, at 390; KISH, supra note
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treatment of the Antarctic's continental shelf as a deep seabed.84 It
then follows that all states may freely exploit water column re-
sources, such as icebergs, which lie within these two respective ar-
eas. 85 Uncontrolled exploitation on an international scale would
soon take its toll on the sensitive Antarctic ecosystem,86 a matter of
utmost concern to the ATG nations.87 It seems unlikely that such a
scenario would be tolerated by the ATG.
To avoid an ecological pillaging of Antarctica, some form of
international administrative apparatus must be established to pro-
mulgate non-preferential guidelines and to assure wise resource
management. 88 The effectiveness of an international regime would
depend upon its possessing some attributes of sovereignty, thereby
enabling it to exercise jurisdiction over the continent and its re-
sources.
89
.4. The Antarctic Treaty of 1959 as Constituting an Antarctic
Regime
It has been suggested that the Antarctic Treaty, when read in
its entirety, constitutes a distinctively regional regime.9" This is
based upon the premise that the Treaty meets all the technical cri-
teria for a "regional arrangement" as provided for in article 52,
82, at 35; Lundquist, supra note 11, at 14; Convention on the High Seas, done Apr. 29, 1958,
13 U.S.T. 2312, T.I.A.S. No. 5200, 450 U.N.T.S. 82 (1962).
84. U.S. Antarctic Policy, supra note 9, at 19; accord, KISH, supra note 82, at 35; see also
Marcoux, supra note 29, at 389. The continental shelf as a legal concept is similar to the
territorial sea in that rights over the continental shelf depend upon sovereignty over the
adjacent land mass. This principle was announced by the International Court of Justice
which held that
the rights of the coastal state in respect to the area of continental shelf that consti-
tutes a natural prolongation of its land territory exist iasofacto and ab initio by
virtue of its sovereignty over the land.
North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, [19691 I.C.J. 3, 22.
85. U.S. Antarctic Policy, supra note 9, at 19.
86. Hambro, supra note 16, at 223. Accord, Mitchell, Antarctica. 4 Special Case?, 3
OCEANS 56 (1977); U.S. Antarctic Policy, supra note 9, at 6.
87. Hambro, supra note 16, at 223.
88. U.S. Antarctic Policy, supra note 9, at 5.
89. The attractiveness of such a proposition is evidenced by the numerous articles that
have been written on the subject. See generally Hanessian, The Antarctic Treaty-1959, 9
INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 436 (1960); P.C. JESSUP & H. TAUBENFELD, CONTROLS OF OUTER
SPACE AND THE ANTARCTIC ANALOGY (1959); Jenks, An International Regimefor Antarctica,
32 INT'L AFF. 414 (1956); O'Connell, The Condominium ofthe New Hebrides, 43 BRIT. Y.B.
INT'L L. 71 (1966); Auburn, The Ross Dependency-An Undeclared Condominium, I AUCK-
LAND U.L. REV. 89 (1972); Hambro, supra note 16; Hayton, supra note 42; Marcoux, supra
note 29.
90. Hayton, supra note 42, at 366.
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chapter VIII of the United Nations Charter.91 The proponent of
this view notes that "[tihere are provisions for consultation and
peaceful settlement of local disputes, a defined area, and dedication
of that area to peaceful use. Action is required to be consistent with
the [United Nations] Charter; the agreement appears not to violate
any of the Charter's principles or purposes." 92 It is further sug-
gested that the Antarctic Treaty's obligations are equally binding
on member and non-member nations. 93 This conclusion is based
upon the language of article X which provides that "each of the
Contracting Parties undertakes to exert appropriate efforts, consis-
tent with the Charter of the United Nations, to the end that no one
engages in any activity in Antarctica contrary to the principles or
purposes of the present Treaty. '94 It is doubtful that the ambigu-
ous language of article X can be construed as lawfully binding non-
signatory states to the provisions of the Antarctic Treaty.95 Such a
proposition would directly contravene the well-settled principle
that treaties are binding only upon the signatories and cannot cre-
ate rights or obligations on behalf of third parties without their con-
sent.96 A more reasonable, though broad, interpretation of article
X is that a fiduciary obligation is imposed upon the signatories to
discourage non-member states from conducting activities which
clearly contravene the Treaty.97
Assuming, arguendo, that the Treaty could be construed as
9 I. Id The article provides, inter alia, that:
1. Nothing in the present Charter precludes the existence of regional arrange-
ments or agencies for dealing with such matters relating to the maintenance of in-
ternational peace and security as are appropriate for regional action, provided that
such arrangements or agencies and their activities are consistent with the Purpose
and Principles of the United Nations. 2. The Members of the United Nations
entering into such arrangements or constituting such agencies shall make every ef-
fort to achieve pacific settlement of local disputes through such regional arrange-
ments or by such regional agencies before referring them to the Security Council.
3. The Security Council shall encourage the development of pacific settlement of
local disputes through such regional arrangements or by reference from the Secur-
ity Council.
U.N. CHARTER art. 52.
92. Hayton, supra note 42, at 366.
93. Id But see Hanessian, supra note 89, at 470.
94. Antarctic Treaty, supra note 1, art. X (emphasis added).
95. See Hanessian, supra note 89, at 470.
96. Id; see also I. BROWNLIE, BASIC DOCUMENTS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 246 (2d ed.
1972).
97. [Tjhe Antarctic Treaty places a special responsibility upon the Contracting Par-
ties to exert appropriate efforts, consistent with the Charter of the United Nations,
to the end that no one engages in any activity in the Antarctic Treaty Area contrary
to the principles or purposes of the Treaty.
Hambro, supra note 16, at 222 n.31; see also BROWNLIE, supra note 24, at 259.
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binding non-member states, its conspicuous silence on resource ex-
ploitation would still demand extensive renegotiation among the
ATG. This could well result in a reawakening of the presently dor-
mant sovereignty issue.98 Thus, construing the Antarctic Treaty as
creating an internationally cognizable entity in its present form is
probably untenable.
B. Antarctica Under Trusteeship of the United Nations
It has been suggested that Antarctic coastal waters be placed
under the trusteeship of the United Nations for the purpose of reg-
ulating resource exploitation.99 Under this approach, jurisdiction
would be vested in the United Nations which in turn would dele-
gate administrative powers to one nation, or a group of nations,
such as the ATG.1 The administering body would then be em-
powered either to develop the area itself or to issue licenses to inter-
ested parties.10 Alternatively, this view holds that the trusteeship
could be delegated to an international administrative agency such
as the proposed United Nations Seabed Authority.0 2 The legal
justification for such a regime lies primarily in "the vagueness of
the 1959 Antarctic Treaty as to precise claims of sovereignty and
possession . . ,1o3 Although it is conceded that this proposal ne-
glects the interests of those nations which had the foresight to initi-
ate Antarctic exploration, it is argued that this inequity is
outweighed by the material benefits inuring to the world commu-
nity from its participation in resource exploitation." A similar
view, recently advanced during the recent Law of the Sea negotia-
tions, has jeopardized future United States participation in that
conference. 0 5 Hence, further examination must be made into the
98. Hanessian, supra note 9, at 68.
99. See generally Marcoux, supra note 29.
100. Id at 402.
101. Id
102. Id
103. Id at 403.
A legal argument for internationalization is that the quasi-sovereign Antarctic
claimant nations historically have made no reference to the continental margin.
Further, those interests are denied expansion by Article IV(2) of the 1959 treaty.
The unique political status quo on the land permits the unique internationalization
of a submerged continental landmass because the crucial interest of the "coastal
state" at international law is missing.
Id
104. Marcoux, supra note 29, at 398.
105. Special Representative of the President to the Law of the Sea Conference, Ambassa-
dor Elliot L. Richardson, stated that "the new 'composite' text concerning the system of
exploitation and governance of the deep seabed area (Part XI) is now fundamentally unac-
1979
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negative implications of this position in the eyes of the ATG na-
tions.
Implementation of such an international solution would un-
doubtedly be met with formidable opposition. 106 The imposition of
such a regime over the Antarctic may well prompt the disapproba-
tion of the United States and the Soviet Union.1°7 Certainly, a
more serious reaction could be expected from the seven ATG na-
tions that have espoused territorial claims to approximately eighty-
five percent of the Antarctic continent. 0 8 Ultimately, it would be
difficult, if not impossible, to convince the claimant ATG nations
that potential resource wealth which they view as their own must
now be shared with the world community.' 0 9 Pragmatic reasons
also exist for opposing such a regime. The ATG states are possibly
the most qualified to institute a wise and well-planned program of
resource management due to their extensive Antarctic experi-
ence."10 Hence, the attractiveness of a United Nations trusteeship
proposal is greatly diminished by its political drawbacks."'
C The Concept of an Antarctic Condominium
A third approach to the establishment of an organized body to
govern resource exploitation is the concept of an Antarctic Condo-
minium."1 2 A condominium may be defined as the conjoint exer-
cise of sovereignty over a region by two or more states."l 3 This
ceptable." This statement was made in response to an unofficial negotiating text which
would purportedly vest vast powers in the proposed United Nations Seabed Authority.
United States opposition to this view was clearly indicated by Ambassador Richardson when
he stated:
I am led now to recommend to the President of the United States that our Govern-
ment must review not only the balance among our substantive interest, but also
whether an agreement acceptable to all governments can best be achieved through
the kind of negotiations which have thus far taken place.
United States Mission to the United Nations, Press Release USUN-57(77) (July 20, 1977).
106. See generaly JESSUP & TAUBENFELD, supra note 89.
107. 1d at 182.
108. See Mitchell, supra note 86, at 57.
109. Lundquist, supra note 11, at 15.
110. Marcoux, supra note 29, at 399.
111. Such a solution, while solving some problems, invites unwelcome political com-
plication. Voting arrangements which would avoid an undesirable veto power,
generally give undue political weight to non-contributing states - to blocks of
states. Further. . .[it] would probably arouse the opposition of those who fear to
lend prestige and provide significant precedent for further experiments in interna-
tional government . ...
JEsSUP & TAUBENFELD, supra note 89, at 182.
112. See generally Jenks, supra note 89; see also note 84 supra, and authorities cited
therein.
113. HACKWORTH, supra note 17, at 56.
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does not mean that two sovereigns coexist within the same territory,
but rather that sovereignty is vested in an entity comprising the
governments of the two or more condomini. I14 The condomini are
the respective states which have participated in the establishment
and administration of the condominium." 5 Thus, in Antarctica, a
condominium would involve the twelve original Treaty nations -
each state constituting an individual condomini."
16
Such a regime could be limited to the continent's coastal wa-
ters, " 7 thus circumventing the controversy over territorial claims.
The ATG nations would merge their claims and interests and
thereby provide a framework within which to defend those interests
collectively against outsiders." 8 Upon the vesting of sovereignty in
one Federation of Antarctic States (FAS), all coastal waters, as well
as the continental shelf, would fall under the jurisdiction of the
condominium which in turn would be empowered to regulate all
resource exploitation. A survey of the relevant writings reveals that
three general prototypes of the condominium concept have been
proposed.
1. The "Functional Administration" Approach. The func-
tional administration approach suggests that an international re-
gime for Antarctica should not be based on existing concepts of
territorial sovereignty or trusteeship." 9 This view stresses the func-
tional attributes of a multilateral commission which "[m]ight de-
velop on a functional basis in some form peculiarly appropriate to
the needs of uninhabited territory unsuitable for normal habitation
in which it is desired to provide certain common international serv-
ices." 1
20
Under this first prototype, title to natural resources would be
suspended. Those states exercising authority at any particular time
over any area of the continent would be empowered to issue re-
source exploitation licenses.' 2 ' Title to the minerals would vest in
the licensee upon extraction.
22
114. O'Connell, supra note 89, at 8 1.
115. Id
116. Rose, supra note 11, at 26.
117. See Marcoux, supra note 29, at 396.
118. Jenks, supra note 89, at 417; See also Rose, supra note 11, at 26.
119. See Jenks, supra note 89, at 418.
120. Id.
121. Id at 423.
122. Id
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However, when cast in the light of the sovereignty claims issue,
this approach reveals two major drawbacks. First, the very act of
granting licenses would amount to a de facto exercise of sover-
eignty.1 23 Although this approach might be feasible in areas where
only one state has made a claim, serious consequences would arise
in those sectors wherein two or more overlapping claims exist.'
24
The second objection is that those states that have consistently re-
fused to recognize or assert territorial claims would find the issu-
ance of licenses totally unacceptable. This conclusion has logical
support, since acquiescence by these states to such a licensing
scheme arguably would imply recognition of the claimant states'
position. 1
25
2. The "Common Fund"Approach. The second prototype of
the condominium concept is described in terms of the "common
fund"'126 theory whereby "the parties in common would give the
necessary concessions, and. . . the royalties would be paid into a
common fund."' 27 One clear advantage to this proposal is that it
could be implemented within the present Treaty's framework.
128
Nonsignatory states could become active partners in the fund by
acceding to the Treaty through the mechanism provided in article
XIII. 29 This provision permits accession by "any state which is a
Member of the United Nations, or. .. any other state which may
be invited to accede."' 130 Final accession would require the unani-
mous consent of all twelve original contracting states. '
3'
Despite the alluring qualities of this prototype, extensive study
into the scope of resource exploitation permitted under the present
Treaty would still be required. Thus, the "common fund" concept
123. Hambro, supra note 16, at 223; see also Rose, supra note 11, at 25.
124. Hambro, supra note 16, at 223. For instance, any exploitation undertaken between
53' and 740 West Longitude and below 600 South Latitude would be subject to the simulta-
neous claims of Argentina, Chile, and Great Britain. Serious questions would inevitably
arise as to which of these sovereigns would be entitled to issue licenses. That such questions
would result in conflict is evident from past confrontations among ATG nations over the
legitimacy of certain outposts maintained within the "overlapping claims" area. WHITEMAN,
supra note 8, at 1238.
125. WHITEMAN, supra note 8, at 1238; see also Marcoux, supra note 29, at 401; accord,
McDOWELL, supra note 13, at 106.
126. Hambro, supra note 16, at 224.
127. Id
128. Id
129. Marcoux, supra note 29, at 400.
130. Antarctic Treaty, supra note 1, art. XIII.
131. Id art. XIII(l).
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appears to be afflicted with the same weakness observed earlier
under the Antarctic Treaty Regime.
32
3. An International Corporation for Antarctica. Perhaps the
most pragmatic solution to regulating resource exploitation in Ant-
arctica would be the creation of a company incorporated under the
authority of an Antarctic condominium. 133 A hypothetical Com-
pany for the Exploitation of the Minerals of Antarctica (CEMOA)
has been depicted as follows: "stock would be allocated on the basis
of the extent of the exploration and development of the continent
. . . . The capital would presumably be contributed proportion-
ately by the shareholders, who would have a vote on the control
board and a share in the profits corresponding to their stock hold-
ing.",134 Initial capital for the corporation would be generated by
the issuance of nontransferable stock certificates, either equally to
all ATG nations or in proportion to the degree of participation by
each respective state.' 35 Naturally, under the latter scheme, special
managerial benefits would accrue from increased participation.
136
One clear advantage to the "condominium-corporation" ap-
proach is that it would take into account the pre-existing interests
of the ATG.' 37 Each ATG state would be granted equal powers.
Uniformity of decisions could be assured by implementing a veto
formula not dissimilar to that presently employed by the Security
Council of the United Nations. 138 On the other hand, the day-to-
day business decisions of the stock corporation would not require
unanimous approval of all twelve condomini but would be left to
the management of a board of thirteen directors, each condomini
appointing one director, the thirteenth being appointed by the con-
132. Since both the "common fund" and "regional arrangement" prototypes would be
implemented within the Treaty's present framework, it follows that they would be governed
by that document's provisions. However, if it is determined that the Treaty's provisions are
inherently deficient relative to resource exploitation, any regime created thereunder would
be equally handicapped. See notes 9-13 & 98 supra, and accompanying text.
133. An example of such a company is the EUROCHEMIC corporation established
under the auspices of the OEEC to deal with the processing of irradiated fuels. See JESSUP &
TAUBENFELD, supra note 89, at 187.
134. Id at 188.
135. Id
136. Id
137. Cf Marcoux, supra note 29, at 399 (wherein the author concedes that it is "arguably
more equitable to allow the nations which had the foresight and initiative to explore the
Antarctic to profit from the natural wealth their efforts make available").
138. Rose, supra note 11, at 27.
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dominium authority. 39
Possibly the greatest benefit to be derived from the condomin-
ium approach would be the final laying to rest of the controversial
sovereignty issue. With each state sharing equal jurisdiction over
the entire continent, the need to vie for territorial control among
the ATG would no longer exist. Thus, a greater spirit of harmoni-
ous cooperation would be attained which in turn would further ad-
vance the basic objectives of the Antarctic Treaty. t4°
Perhaps the single greatest legal obstacle to the establishment
of an Antarctic Condominium is presented by the Treaty itself. It
has been argued that the vesting of sovereignty in any body,
whether a condominium or otherwise, would violate the sover-
eignty claims compromise clause of article IV."' The specific lan-
guage supportive of this argument reads as follows:
No acts or activites taking place while the present Treaty is in
force shall constitute a basis for asserting, supporting or denying
a claim to territorial sovereignty in Antarctica or create any
rights of sovereignty in Antarctica. No new claim. . . to territo-
rial sovereignty in Antarctica shall be asserted while the present
Treaty is in force.1
4 2
This language can be construed to proscribe the establishment of
an Antarctic Condominium. However, when read in conjunction
with the article's first clause, 143 it appears that the prohibition
against "new claims" of sovereignty is directed solely to the original
contracting states as individual parties. The article makes no refer-
ence to the possibility that ATG states might simultaneously merge
their claims. Furthermore, its language is silent with respect to col-
lective action that might be undertaken by the signatories. Thus,
the language of article IV arguably contains a significant loophole
providing for the joint assertion of sovereignty by all twelve origi-
nal signatories.'" Ultimately, any problems posed by the language
139. The choice of 13 directors is purely arbitrary - any odd number could be utilized.
The important factor, however, is that the corporation's directorship be representative of
each condomini's equity interest. In turn, it is essential that at least one director be ap-
pointed by the condominium authority to assure against the possibility of deadlocks. Such
matters could be resolved by the ATG signatories in the course of their negotiations for the
creation of the condominium authority.
140. See note 8 supra, and accompanying text; see also Rose, supra note 11, at 27.
141. Antarctic Treaty, supra note 1, art. IV(2); see also note 27 supra, and accompanying
text.
142. Antarctic Treaty, supra note I, art. IV(2) (emphasis added).
143. See note 27 supra.
144. Indeed, one writer has attributed this conspicuous omission to the distinct possibility
that such action was contemplated by the signatories at the time of the Treaty's execution.
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of article IV could be resolved by the ATG during negotiations for
the creation of an Antarctic Condominium.
45
IV. CONCLUSION
It has been demonstrated that the Antarctic Treaty of 1959 is
unquestionably deficient in meeting the myriad of problems posed
.by Antarctic resource exploitation. This would apply with equal
force to the harvesting of water column resources such as icebergs.
However, in the case of iceberg harvesting, these deficiencies be-
come more acute since the doctrine of erosion renders icebergs
freely appropriable notwithstanding the possible existence of sover-
eignty in the calving ice shelf.
In light of these patent treaty weaknesses vis4z-vis iceberg har-
vesting, the need for a modern solution becomes manifest. Without
question, any legal regime would have to give strong consideration
to the presently existing interests of the ATG nations. This might
aptly be achieved through the implementation of a condominium
prototype. Above all, caution must be taken to avoid the resurrec-
tion of the "sovereignty claims" spectre.
The time is ripe for the ATG nations to embark on a rethink-
ing of their traditional positions. They should not permit their na-
tional avarice to launch them on a course of uncontrolled
exploitation which would inevitably end in the villification of the
world's last virgin continent. Ultimately, any new agreement must
further embellish the underlying principles of the Antarctic Treaty
- the preservation of the continent as a natural laboratory for sci-
ence and the continued spirit of peaceful cooperation which has
marked Antarctica as a model of international coexistence.
Emil A. Zuccaro
An interesting point is that there does not appear to be anything in [article IV] to
preclude two or more contracting parties from asserting a joint claim . . . or the
assertion of a joint claim by all twelve signatories to the whole of Antarctica. The
latter may well be contemplated in the future, as it would be one way of effectively
scaling off Antarctica from. .. 'third parties' . . . .
Hanessian, supra note 89, at 470.
145. Implementation of the suggested proposal could be achieved via the Treaty's own
amendment provision appearing in the first paragraph of article XII.
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